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A Conspiracy of Cartographers: 










What was the last thing I said before we 
wandered off? 
When was that? 
I can't remember. 
What a shambles! We're just not getting 
anywhere. 
Not even England. I don't believe in it anyway. 
What? 
England. 
Just a conspiracy of cartographers, you mean?' 
I would like to think that the editors asked me to respond to the various 
essays treating postmodernism in a recent issue of Folklore Forum because 
they believed that I had some startlingly fresh take on these issues, or that I 
represent an elder cohort of graduate students wizened by the years, or that 
my background in literary studies and literary theory suggests the possibility 
of a considered resolution of folklore study and postmodern theory, or that my 
sabbatical from graduate studies to work in the business world gives me some 
insight into how these issues are seen from a more quotidian (if not also equally 
troubled) point of view. I suspect, however, that it was simply that I agreed 
to do it and have since been unable to loose myself from the responsibility. 
I would like to thank the four contributors-Stephen Olbrys, Troy Boyer, 
Gregory Hansen, and Natalie Underberg-for making my job easier. 
I think it would be a foolish response that wondered "Crisis? What 
crisis?" in the face of such serious complaints as the authors raise about the 
academy as they have encountered it. In what follows, I try my best to 
delineate a few patterns in the thinking of the contributors and to offer a few 
frameworks for thinking about our current context. As at least one of the 
essays makes clear, proffered solutions come with someone else's definition 
of the problem, which is often more dangerous. 
Talking Postmodern Blues: 
Folklorists and the Postmodern Condition 
Olbrys's essay urged graduate students in a number of directions. His 
chronicle qua history sidesteps defining the nature of the current crisis, as it 
is termed, and highlights a very interesting idea: crises in folklore studies 
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would seem to be the natural state of the discipline, calling into question the 
very nature and role of crisis itself. It is an interesting string of occurrences, 
with each advocate seeing a crisis and calling fellow folklorists to action: 
Utley pleaded for a resolution to antagonisms between anthropological 
and literary folklorists in order to save the stuff of folklore itself; 
Herskovits longed for an integration of knowledge; Dorson favored a 
pragmatism that would define folklore in distinction to other areas of 
inquiry; and Glassie a greater record of publication to increase the visibility 
and accessibility of folkloristic scholarship. I am sure that had he looked 
elsewhere, Olbrys would have found more crises. 
So then, crisis is a traditional genre. What does it do? What is its 
function? For one, it would seem to give the individual sighting cum siting 
cum citing the crisis a certain authority to speak. After all, the person who 
first smells smoke has a certain responsibility to cry out "fire!" and in urging 
us out of the house, we are thankful for the guidance. An institutional crisis, 
which Olbrys occasionally elides with revolution, is an opportunity to sound 
the alarm, to utter a battle cry. And indeed, the martial metaphors seem to 
bear out: Boyer states his intention to hunker down and remain true to himself 
(95) and Hansen urges folklorists to take up arms, in the forms of "ballads, 
fiddle tunes, blues songs, and tall tales" (loo), which will be used to beat 
back the decentering enemy.2 In both these cases, the rhetoric employed 
here is one of propping up existing institutional structures in the face of the 
barbarians at the gate. Elsewhere and at other times, the call to crisis is the 
call to dismantle conventions or institutions, but in folklore the impulse seems 
historically to have been counter-revolutionary. For Boyer and Hansen, 
folklorists have become too concerned with "theory" and theorizing, and it 
is now time to return to the stuff itself and to the people(s) themselves. 
While Olbrys fails to define the nature of the crisis as he perceives it 
all that clearly, it would seem that it is precisely this failure to integrate 
theory and material into useful scholarship that is his complaint. He notes: 
Integrative work, then, is the consistent and central idea of folklore's 
survival, regardless of how the crisis is operating in any given year. 
. . . Other disciplines gripped with postmodernism may or may not 
grapple with this issue of balance between the universal and the 
particular, and to be honest, this is probably a good card for us to 
have in our hand. (62) 
Olbrys goes on to argue that the tension between theory and "the stuff of 
folklore" can be a productive one and that the concern with things postmodern 
within the academy can be used to folklore's advantage (64). His fellow 
contributors do not agree: for Boyer, postmodernism is a lund of dilettantism, 
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what he terms "middle-class pretentious liberalism" (95). For Hansen, 
postmodernism is a kind of solipsism where "what becomes centered is the 
subjective reflections and concerns of the postmodernist cultural critic" (100). 
Even for Underberg, there is some concern that postmodernism will lead to 
an "over-homogenizing [of] the fields of social science and the humanities 
into one dominant paradigm with little or no room for movement" (103). 
As a respondent, I have an obligation to read the question of Olbrys's 
title over and against the specter which gets raised most often in his essay 
and which is the more specific subject of the essays that follow. In all these 
cases, whether a crisis or not, postmodernism is a primary concern. Reading 
these essays, though, one is reminded of the Indian legend about the six 
blind men and the elephant, in which each came away with a different 
definition of an elephant based on what part of the elephant he encountered. 
Just as one of the subtexts of Olbrys's essay is that crises in folklore are 
ongoing, I would argue that generalizing about "theory" (as it has come to 
be regarded in many quarters of the academy) based on a select set of 
attributes that an individual has encountered and then damning the whole 
enterprise is an ongoing tradition as well. In framing things in this way, it is 
not my intention to dismiss any of the misgivings or concerns that the authors 
involved may have: instead, I hope to begin to think through the current 
climate in which we find ourselves. 
In Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism after Structuralism, Jonathan 
Culler notes that "if the observers of recent critical debates could agree on 
anything, it would be that contemporary critical theory is confusing and 
confused" (17). Writing in 1982, Culler is commenting upon debates taking 
place in the late seventies. And yet the same holds true today. A discussion 
of "what is at stake in today's critical debates" (18) has been with us for 
some time now, and in fact Culler points to some of the very same features 
that our authors cite: the instability or lack of key terms, the inability to 
distinguish one camp from another, the shifts of individuals (or claims about 
them) from one arena of concern to another, andlor stupefaction in the face 
of trying to make sense of either the scene itself or any of the writing generated 
by members of the scene. I think it especially interesting that structuralism 
was once described as "an indeterminate radical force . . . perceived as 
extreme, as violating previous assumptions about literature and criticism, 
though there is disagreement about how it does so" (22). 
If, as Henry Glassie once noted, culture is what we agree to argue 
about, then in a number of ways we are living in something that might very 
well be termed "postmodernity," for in some form or another, in both public 
and academic discourses, postmodernism and its many itinerant subsets 
dominate our debates. Even today's spin doctors seem to be capitalizing on 
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the idea that meaning is itself a product of a much more complex and 
sometimes arbitrary set of relationships than we were once willing to admit. 
I do have to disagree, however, with Glassie when he quarrels with 
poststructuralism or postmodernism for presuming to displace structuralism 
or modernism. Too many observers often assume that if postmodernism has 
succeeded modernism it must also have refuted it or transcended it: post hoe 
ergo ultra hoc.'While many practitioners would make some sort of distinction 
between structuralism as an "attempt to develop 'grammars'-systematic 
inventories of elements and their possibilities of combination-that would 
account for the form and meaning of texts" and postructuralism as 
investigation into "the way in which this project is subverted by the texts 
themselves" (Culler 221, most would also agree that such critiques were 
already under way in many of the early structuralist writings. 
Postmodernism in one of its earliest formulations, in Arnold Toynbee's 
A Study of History, described "the new historical cycle which started in 1875 
with the end of western dominance, the decfine of individualism, capitalism 
and Christianity, and the rise to power of non-western cultures."Vhile most 
of us would question the idea of capitalism's demise within the postmodern, 
few would argue with the rest of Toynbee's nascent de~cription.~ While 
Toynbee's usage was on the whole ambivalent-he was fairly skeptical as 
an historian-it was not long before the term came to be used p~lemically.~ 
By 1965, Leslie Fiedler had "tied [postmodernism] to current radical trends 
which made up the counter-culture: 'post-humanist, post-male, post-white, 
post-heroic"' (Jencks 3). As Jencks continues his history of postmodernism 
into the 1970s, he notes that within the artistic realms of art, architecture, 
and literature, the manifestation of postmodern movements was to combat 
what were perceived as modernist orthodoxies that were elitist and 
bureaucratic. In the case of architecture, postmodernists were concerned with 
the destruction of the urban landscape that modernist building projects had 
wrought, and in literature, novelists like John Barth aspired "to a fiction 
more democratic in its appeal than such late-modernist marvels . . . as 
Beckett's Stories and Texts for Nothing or Nabokov's Pale Fire" (Jencks 7) .  
While we may dispute such evaluations of modernist works, it is safe 
to assert, I believe, that the impulses remain and are especially strong within 
the discipline of folklore. Are we not also interested in undermining conceptions 
and instantiations of the elite? Are we not also concerned with the destruction 
of landscapes that also mean the destruction of cultures and ways of living that 
have existed for decades if not centuries? Are we not interested in a more 
democratic understanding of artistic and intellectual activity? Postmodernist 
concerns would seem to be ours. Perhaps a reconsideration of postmodernist 
concerns is worth dedicating a little time to here. 
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Signs, Signs, Everywhere Signs: Another Map of Postmodernity 
However you want to name the current questioning occurring across 
an ever-broadening range of disciplines and fields and however much you 
evaluate this shift as real or pretended-names and terms change but practices 
do not-there has been a shift towards drama in theories of knowledge. 
Drama here is not incidental to the larger discussion. Whether it be rear 
guard actions fought by conservative stalwarts of some form of positivism 
or avant-garde manifestos advocating nominalism, rhetorical grandstanding 
sometimes seems to preoccupy us. While it is true that much of the work 
that serves as a foundation for different, but essentially, semiotic theories of 
language, culture, and subjectivity originated in such late nineteenth, early 
twentieth century comparative projects like folkloristics and linguistics (often 
focused around the issue of "personality and culture" in the Anglo-American 
traditions), the social science nature of the comparative project gave way to 
one of textual interpretation. As old monoliths fall, a lot of "deaths" or "ends" 
are announced (see, for example, Tyler 1985 or Dorst 1987). The social 
sciences seem especially hard hit, where their reliance on empirical methods 
and metaphysics would seem to have left them vulnerable. I exaggerate of 
course. But I am interested in how these claims play themselves out and 
what phoenixes may arise from the ashes. I am invested in the possibility of 
the ethnographic project, in the exchange that takes place both on the ground 
and later in discursive production. 
Fundamentally I take the postmodernist project to be the deconstruction 
of mind, truth, language, reality, and philosophy. In doing so, meaning 
becomes conventional and formal, and life becomes a continuance that is 
always looping outside those conventions, stretching beyond the bounds of 
the conventionally meaningful, in effect demanding meaning-malung. In 
short, I understand the postmodernist project as an attempt to banish forever 
any and all notions of transcendence, replacing the self of old with a 
subjectivity that is simultaneously embodied, social, desiring, autonomous, 
and interrelated with others. Or as Jane Flax puts it: "The Real is unstable 
and perpetually in flux. Western metaphysics creates a false appearance of 
unity by reducing the flux and heterogeneity of experience into binary and 
supposedly natural or essentialist oppositions" (1990:36). 
As others have noted, a major problem with the various postmodernist 
projects is their inability to account for the very "taken-for-granteds" that 
they seek to unnaturalize: the list of 'no-longer-possibles' (realism, 
representation, subjectivity, history, etc.) is . . . long in poststructuralism" 
(Huyssen 1990:259). A debate has arisen around the reification of both the 
essential self and the fragmented subject, with those opposed to the latter 
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claiming that it depletes the oppositional forces of individual agents engaged 
in political struggle (cf. Paul Smith 1988). What has been confused, though, 
is the nature of such proclamations of the "death of the author" (cf. Barthes 
1977: 142- 148; Foucault 1988: 197-210); that is, what these essays herald is 
actually the end of transcendent meaning, or superordinary explanation: "we 
know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a single 'theological 
meaning' " (Barthes 146). Thus the real loss is the transcendent critic, not 
the originating author, Meaning is multiple and diffuse, and most importantly, 
since it varies even across the same audience, it is contextual. Thus the critic's 
job is not to specify meanings but to detail available meanings and ascertain, 
as much as possible, the relevant hierarchies-"preferred" meanings-that 
impinge on the discursive utterance such that a dominant meaning may be 
discovered (cf. Jakobson 1978: 82-87). 
While the loss of determinate meaning is certainly true in literary 
discursive production, the same cannot be said of discursive productions 
occurring at other levels. It is certainly pdssible to determine the range of 
possible meaning as well as the dominant meaning at the microlevel of 
folkloric discursive production, since we are readily able to follow flows of 
action as well as interview both authors and audiences. As such, what 
postmodernism demands is that we study local economies of thought and 
action. (That is about as close to a manifesto as I will get here.) Any number 
of scholars and observers have followed this logic as well (cf. Speer 1992), 
seeing critical, literary theory as a starting point for studies that more closely 
resemble ethnographies of speaking (cf. Hymes 1974), where by charting 
linguistic relationships, researchers hope to reveal concretizations of social 
relationships and thus have a place from which to start thinking about power 
and the way it is produced and reproduced in different instances. 
What literary studies and the social sciences share now is the problem 
of the referentiality of language. As Hayden White notes: "The disappearance 
of language into literature and of language into signs inevitably inflates the 
value of the critical performance while at the same time investing that 
performance with the aspect of a mystery" (1978:267). What it has meant is 
that anthropologists now worry about their textual productions, and 
literary scholars are now doing cultural studies in order to anchor their 
interpretations. Social scientists and literary scholars alike worry about how 
their own texts possess accuracy. 
The matter is in the foreground in the social sciences, especially as 
they adapt and think through theories of literary discursive production. The 
empirical project posited a distance between observer and observed. The 
ethnographer was expected, as a result, to be able to get at the essence of a 
culture andlor society and report it back using a kind of unreflective realism 
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that revealed a one-to-one equivalency between events and their 
representations. Theories of postmodern ethnography-not a fortuitous 
term-working out of textual theories of language and discourse that 
highlight the inextricability of everything, have arrived at the conclusion 
that the gap is unbridgeable. 
At the root of the so-called postmodern crisis of representation is a 
radical cultural relativism juxtaposed with a certain kind of cultural 
determinism: that is, culture (here linguistically conceived) determines our 
patterns of conception so completely that it is impossible to know other 
kinds of cultural patternings except through reference to our own, which is 
not knowing the "other" patterns as they are. Elaborations in the social 
sciences take a variety of forms, but they are usually aimed as revealing the 
politics of representation beneath all textual productions. I do not mean this 
to seem dismissive of the matter, because the politics of representation is a 
key modality in the politics of culture. The gaze, be it scholastic or popular, 
shapes and is shaped by very real power relations that I am interested in. To 
arrive at a just image, we must pursue a just means of production and 
(re)presentation, and that entails exchanges on the ground. 
Several things once distinct have been fused in recent thinking about 
the nature of knowing, or perhaps more aptly, the distinctions have been 
refused. Ontology, the nature of ultimate reality, succumbs to epistemology, 
what we can know of reality and how we know it, because we can only 
know the world through structures or systems of thought, be they linguistic 
or other. Most scientific discourses, which turn out to be kinds of realistic 
fictions, deny this representation aspect of their work. These discourses rely 
upon objectifying practices in order to persuade, under the guise that there 
is no persuasion but simply the truth being presented. Science then means that 
"disciplined and self-denying ordinance of method which keeps a safe distance 
between its subject of study and the discourse that seeks to comprehend it (Nonis 
1982: 16). What recent theorizing of discourses and practices tries to do is 
collapse the distancing of objectifying protocols in order to foreground 
whatever ideological machinations might underlie particular projects. 
Hermeneutically-influenced theories of discourse and texts bring with 
them, however, some equally disturbing presuppositions, the impossibility 
of getting outside the hermeneutic circle being one of them. As Heidegger 
noted, "any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must have 
already understood what is to be interpreted" (1962: 194). This kind of theory 
of cultural communications severely limits the type and degree of connection 
that can be achieved. Susanne Kirschner notes that, for ethnography, 
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knowledge "as it evolves over the course of fieldwork, and as it is fixed in 
the form of the [ethnographic] text . . . is not seen to be derived from any 
sense that. . . separateness and distance have been dissolved or attentuated" 
(1987:212). In the discussion that follows, she distinguishes between two 
different approaches to ethnographic knowledge. The first is of the kind I 
have been discussing, radically hermeneutical, which she calls "interpretive"; 
the second is the "subjectivist" approach, which she describes as 
"nonrational." The latter would seem to have the strength of taking even 
more seriously arguments latent in certain theories of subjectivity and 
discourse-those that notably circumscribe the realm of language and 
stability-and of also being able to absorb recent explorations by various 
sciences into the process of cognition. 
The chief problem with the interpretive approach is that despite all 
attempts to make this seem an incredibly rich method of study-and I cannot 
help but believe that possibility remains-the externality of all transactions 
that transpire in the field make ultimately for a thinness: 
Things become more secure as this liminal world is mutually 
constructed but, by definition, it never really loses its quality of 
externality. . . . What is given form is this communication. . . . This 
informing [goes on] in interpersonal interaction. It is intersubjective, 
between subjects. At best, it is partial and thin. (Rabinow 1977:154-155) 
In some way, when everything becomes text, or open to textual interpretive 
methods, everything becomes superficial. Reading has increasingly become 
to mean more than scansion of words on a page and now refers to any process 
that is temporal, limited, and essentially planar. We now speak of reading 
paintings, reading a situation, and most importantly, of reading relationships. 
Michel Foucault discusses a similar effect being produced by the redoubled 
discourses of sexuality in the nineteenth century: 
By no longer making the confession a test, but rather a sign, and by 
making sexuality something to be interpreted, the nineteenth century 
gave itself the possibility of causing the procedures of confession to 
operate within the regular formation of scientific discourse. (1978:67) 
The possible texts for analysis become a series of concentric circles: the 
abstracted item (story, joke, song), the item in situ, performer and item, 
performer and audience, or finally the performer and fieldworker. All of 
these are available as texts for analysis, synchronically andlor diachronically. 
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Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Can't Be Dead 
One of my favorite definitions of postmodernism came in a 
conversation with Wahneema Lubiano who noted that postmodernism is not 
a historical moment so much as a moment in history, a moment when those 
who had not thought of themselves as having bodies of a particular gender, 
color, or status-in other words, they had not thought of themselves as 
having bodies at all-suddenly realized that they not only had bodies 
but were bodies, bodies among many other bodies. She summed it up 
thusly: "It's a kind of 'welcome to the world' for white guys."' The result 
has often been that figures like irony and the ultimate indeterminability 
of meaning have gotten far more play than they have deserved. And those 
dimensions of postmodernist critical practice are certainly worth our 
skepticism and abashedness. 
What I hope to have shown in this brief consideration of the kinds of 
issues that the four initial contributors first raised is that postmodernism is 
something worth confronting and attempting to think through. Many of its fields 
of inquiry, such as in the nascent cultural studies, are still too unformed. I think 
folklorists could potentially play key roles in helping form them. With the 
appointments of Bill Ferris and Bill Ivey to the endowments, no one would 
mistake folklorists for not being able to negotiate the fine institutional lines 
between art with a capital A and the other arts we have long championed. 
Stephen Olbrys in his chronicle makes clear two things: crises are a 
matter of perception, and in the case of postmodernism, the nature of the 
instigating factor is a matter of perception as well. There are as many maps 
of postmodernism as there are maps of the world produced by postmodernists. 
That doesn't mean we should give up on either of them. That wouldn't make 
for a very good ending, now would it? 
Notes 
1. Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead (New York: Grove 
Press, 1967), page 115. 
2. Indeed, this determination to recenter the subject over and against the 
decentering threatened by postmodernism seems a central concern of both authors 
and a dimension of Olbrys's essay, when he explains that "Roemer passionately 
noted that everywhere except in academia, [sic] the individual needs to be 
revalidated, not undermined" (72). 
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3. Both these references to Henry Glassie are from public presentations, the 
former from September 1991 in his F51: Proseminar in Folklore Methods, and the 
latter from March 1996 in his F840: Structuralisms. The confusion of a "post" 
appellation with some claim to transcendence is an observation that Culler makes 
about structuralism and its "post." 
4. Charles Jencks, What is Post-Modernism? (New York: St. Martin's Press), 
page 3. Jencks also notes that while A Study of History was not published until 
1947, after the second world war, Arnold Toynbee in fact conceived of and wrote 
about postmodernism in this light in 1938. For an apparent first coinage of the term, 
see Federico De Onis's Antologia de lapoesia espan6la e hispanoamericana (1934). 
5. Indeed, most contemporary thinkers, whatever their investment in the 
postmodern, would agree that far from being inimical to capitalism, postmodernism 
and what Frederic Jameson and others have termed "late capitalism" are often allied. 
6. See Irving Howe (1963), Gerald Graff (1979), and Harold Levin (1966) 
for negative uses of the term. Jencks also notes that E.H. Gombrich, in "The Origins 
of Stylistic Terminology," discusses how such ill-willed uses of a term can be inverted 
by those who stand accused into something positive. 
7. Lubiano's comments and the ensuing conversation took place during an 
invited talk at Syracuse University in the spring of 1991. 
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